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Hackers slipped malware into Optimizely scripts on the BBC, Zoom, HSBC and 175 other sites

An attacker abused a flaw in Optimizely's A/B testing service to add a crypto stealer, a card skimmer and iPhone exploit code to scripts that big brands load on every page. Optimizely says the hole is fixed and the code is gone.

For most of Monday, visitors to some of the world's best-known websites were loading malware without those sites being hacked at all. An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Web Experimentation product, a widely used A/B testing service, and added malicious code to the scripts that Optimizely delivers to its customers' pages.

What happened

Optimizely Web lets each customer add its own JavaScript to a "Project JavaScript" field, which then runs on every page that loads the customer's Optimizely snippet. According to security firm Report URI, the attacker wrote malicious code into that field across many customer projects. Because the files were still served from Optimizely's content delivery network, the sites treated them as trusted.

Report URI, where researcher Scott Helme spotted the attack, fetched 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected ones belonging to 178 organizations. Named victims include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, along with Optimizely's own sites. Report URI says the real count is probably higher, because it could only check the snippets it found in time.

Report URI's timeline puts the first Optimizely injection, in a BBC snippet, at 04:21 UTC on November 16. A mass clean-up began around 20:40 UTC, TalkTalk's snippet was the last one still infected at 21:52 UTC, and all infected files were reported clean by 23:11 UTC.

What the code did

The malware changed several times during the day, The Register and Report URI report:

  • Crypto clipper: it replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses on the page, in forms and on the clipboard with the attacker's own. Report URI traced about $7,150 to the attacker's wallets by Tuesday.
  • Card skimmer: added at 13:43 UTC, it captured card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into a site's own forms. Card details entered in a payment provider's hosted iframe were out of its reach.
  • Data theft: it sent page addresses, readable cookies and screenshots to the attacker.
  • iPhone exploits: on iPhones and iPads it loaded the Coruna or DarkSword exploit kits in a hidden frame, targeting devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier. Security firm Hudson Rock, quoted by SecurityWeek, says it has seen no evidence that any device was actually compromised.

Hudson Rock and Report URI also found a related loader in scripts from other third-party providers, including Kissmetrics and StorifyMe; Report URI dates that earlier wave to November 13-16. SecurityWeek says it's unclear how the code got into those scripts.

Optimizely's response

On its status page, Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and secured affected user accounts. The Register reports that Optimizely located the flaw in the sign-up process for its experimentation software and says it revoked tokens and notified affected customers. Optimizely hasn't said how many customers were affected.

What to do

If you browsed during Monday, November 16 (UTC):

  • Update your iPhone or iPad. Report URI recommends iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
  • Watch your card statements if you paid by card on a large brand's site that day, especially through a form on the site itself.
  • Check any crypto transfer you made that day, and always compare the pasted wallet address with the one you meant to send to.

If your company uses Optimizely Web: Report URI advises reviewing all Project JavaScript and experiment code for unfamiliar scripts, auditing who can access the account and rotating credentials, treating card data entered on November 16 as possibly exposed, and rotating session tokens stored in cookies that scripts can read. Hudson Rock warns that blocking the attacker's domain may not be enough, because some poisoned scripts carried a full copy of the payload.

Why it matters

This is a supply-chain attack: none of the victims' own servers were breached, but a script they chose to trust was. Report URI checked the security policies of affected sites and found that only about 15% had a Content Security Policy strict enough to block the payload. Helme's summary is that "trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy," and any third-party script that can change a page carries that risk.

Sources

This story is based on reporting from these outlets. Read them for the full picture:

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